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Abstract 
Estimates of the demand for money provide important foundations for 
monetary policy setting but if the estimation technique does not explicitly 
account for structural changes then such estimates will be biased. This paper 
presents an investigation into the level and stability of money demand (M1) for 
Australia and New Zealand over the 1960-2009 period and demonstrates that 
both countries experienced regime shifts; Australia also experienced an 
intercept shift. Application of four time series methods provide consistent 
results with 1984 and 1998 break dates. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stability tests 
reveal that M1 demand functions were unstable over the 1984 to 1998 period 
for both countries although tests for stability are not rejected thereafter. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Empirical analyses of money demand continue with renewed vigor in spite of some 
established stylized facts concerning income and interest rate elasticities. For advanced 
countries it is argued that financial reforms introduced in the early 1970s had significant 
effects on money demand functions and that disequilibrium in money demand functions 
influenced the effectiveness of interest rate policies in the long run, albeit through its 
effects on inflation and the output gap. These reforms and the increased use of money 
substitutes for transactions (e.g. credit/debit cards and electronic money transfers) are 
argued to have increased competition in financial markets and enhanced international 
capital mobility. Scale economies in money demand within and across economies may 
have reduced income elasticities while the contemporaneous utilisation of market based 
interest rate policies may have improved the rate of interest elasticity. 
The choice of monetary policy instrument is crucial; using the incorrect 
instrument will cause income instability. Deadman and Ghatak (1981) postulated that a 
stable money demand function is an important issue because it provides a reliable and 
predictable link between changes in monetary aggregates and changes in variables 
included in the money demand function. Similarly, Poole (1970) argued that the stability 
aspect of money demand is vital for selecting monetary policy instruments. Explicitly, 
Poole used ISLM analysis to show that the money supply (rate of interest) should be 
targeted if money demand is stable (unstable). 
However, even in conditions of stable money demand, many central banks seem 
to be attracted to targeting the rate of interest following the Taylor rule (see Taylor, 
1999).  The rationale behind this perspective lies in the belief that adjusting the lagged 
short term interest rate increases the ability of central banks to influence income and 
thence central banks now pay less attention to the stability of money demand functions. 
Interest rate targeting is a monetary policy framework employed in Australia and 
New Zealand to stabilize inflation, and such policy selection may be based on either the 
Taylor rule or a belief that money demand functions are unstable. Although it appears 
that they have been relatively successful in achieving price stability their policies have 
guaranteed neither balanced growth nor macroeconomic stability; this may be due to the 
added complexities attributable to the liberalization of their financial markets in the 
1980s. Financial market liberalization may have caused some instability in the demand 
for money function which would mean that rate of interest targeting would be the 
appropriate policy option for central banks. However reforms and external shocks may 
have distorted the equilibrium relationship of money demand, and this raises doubts 
about the validity of studies on money demand that do not utilize structural break 
estimation methods. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the stability of money demand (M1) 
relationship for Australia and New Zealand over the 1960-2009 period while accounting 
explicitly for structural changes that might have occurred during the period. We apply i) 
Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) unit root test to test for non-stationarity of the series in the 
presence of two structural breaks, ii) Gregory and Hansen’s (1996a & b) single 
endogenous break test to test for cointegration among the variables and to estimate the 
cointegrating equations. Standard time series techniques of iii) Hendry’s General to 
Specific (GETS), iv) Engle and Granger’s (1987) two step method (EG), v) Phillip and 
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Hansen’s (1990) Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) and vi) Two Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) are then applied to conduct sub-sample period estimations. This 
paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents a review of the literature. The 
methods and empirical results are detailed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Conclusions 
are provided in Section 5. 
 
2. Brief review of time series studies  
 
Although there is a vast literature that presents investigations into the level and stability 
of money demand using cross-section, time-series or panel data estimation methods, 
many of the results are neither totally consistent across studies nor based on estimation 
methods that explicitly allow for structural breaks in the time series relationships. This is 
exemplified by recent studies on money demand that relate to advanced countries and, 
more specifically, to Australia and New Zealand.1  
 
Advanced countries 
 
The stability of money demand functions has been widely researched. Hoffman et al. 
(1995) constrained the income elasticity to be unity when analysing post-war data (1955-
1990) and provided evidence which suggests that M1 demand is stable in Canada, Japan, 
UK, USA and West Germany. Lutkepohl and Wolters (1998) analysed the M3 demand 
relationship for Germany over the 1976-1996 period and corroborates stability when the 
income elasticity was constraint at unity. Similar results were obtained by Maki and 
Kitasaka (2006) and Lucas (1988) for Japan and USA, respectively. 
Studies that estimated unconstrained income elasticities include Artis et al. (1993) 
who identified significant income elasticities around 1.2 for M1 and M2 demand for 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands between 1979 
and 1990; similar estimates were attained by Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn (1993). When 
Ewing and Payne (1999) examined M1 demand for Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, 
Italy, Germany, Switzerland, UK and USA they identified a range of income elasticities 
between 0.5 and 1.2 and suggest that M1 demand was stable in Australia, Austria, 
Finland, Italy, UK and the USA when M1 is cointegrated with real income and the 
nominal interest rate; stability was identified for Canada, Germany and Switzerland also 
but only when the exchange rate was incorporated. Baba et al. (1992) estimated the 
demand for M1 for USA over the 1960-1988 period and obtained an income elasticity of 
around 0.5; comparable results for USA were obtained by Ball (2001) and Choi and Jung 
(2009). Clearly there is dispute over the income elasticity estimate as Haug and Lucas 
(1996) also examined M1 demand for Canada over the 1953-1990 period and attained an 
income elasticity of around 0.4, while similar findings for Canada were obtained by 
Georgopoulos (2000).2 In spite of the large variation in income elasticity estimates the 
                                                 
1  For discussions related to the theoretical developments of the demand for money see Duca and van 
Hoose (2004), Laidler (1993a, 1993b, 1977, 1969), Bruggemann and Nautz (1997), Barnett et al. (1992) 
and Serletis (2001). 
2  Other studies that found no evidence of instability in money demand functions include Hayo (2000) for 
Austria, Juselius (1998) for Denmark, Nielson et al. (2004) for Italy, Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Economidou (2005) for Greece, Gerlach-Kristen (2001) for Switzerland, and Nielsen (2004) and 
Escribano (2004) for the UK. 
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aforementioned studies either implicitly or explicitly support central banks’ monetary 
targeting regimes. 
However efforts by Bahmani-Oskooee and Chomsisengphet (2002) suggest that 
money demand is not universally stable. They assessed the stability of M2 demand for 11 
OECD countries and obtained a range of income elasticities between 0.6 and an 
implausibly high 3.9. Although their findings indicate that money demand is stable in 
Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden and USA they also 
suggest some instability of M2 for Switzerland and the UK. Obtaining evidence against 
the stability of money demand suggests that interest rate targeting is optimal.  
Corroborating evidence for money demand instability is not unheard of. For 
Canada, both McPhail (1991) and Haug (1999) asserted that the openness of financial 
systems had made significant impacts on broader monetary aggregates and therefore 
support interest rate targeting. Similarly, Nagayasu (2003) obtained a near-unit income 
elasticity estimate of M2  demand for Japan over the 1958-2000 period and, through 
application of Hansen’s (1992) stability tests, revealed that M2 demand is unstable. 
Papadopoulos and Zis (1997) investigated the determinants and the stability of 
money demand (M1, M2 and M3) for Greece. Although they find that M2 and M3 are 
largely stable, they also obtain results which suggest that M1 demand is unstable; this 
corroborates earlier findings of Sharma (1994). In a study of the Spanish economy, Vega 
(1998) finds that a structural break, which may capture changes in the openness of the 
financial system, has affected the stability of broad money. This leads Vega to suggest 
that it is reasonable to use the rate of interest to curtail inflation rates.3 
 
The case of Australia 
 
The pioneering study by Cohen and Norton (1969) implied stability in narrow and broad 
measures of money. Their study was replicated and augmented by others for various 
monetary aggregates. Corroborating evidence was provided by Sharpe and Volker (1977) 
and Pagan and Volker (1981) who found limited instability in money demand functions. 
Hoque and Al-Mutairi (1996) investigated the long run relationship between M1 and its 
determinants (income, interest rate and price level) over the 1970-1993 period and found 
no instability in M1 demand despite the countenance of financial innovation and 
deregulation. Valadkhani (2005) examined the determinants of M2 demand over the 
1976-2002 period and found it to be cointegrated with real income, the rate of return on 
10-year Treasury bonds, and cash and inflation rates, with an income elasticity of M2 
demand close to unity. Felmingham and Zhang (2001) examined M2 demand over the 
1976-1998 period and found it to be stable subject to a regime shift occurring during the 
1991 recession, which supported earlier findings by Lim and Martin (1991), Juselius and 
Hargreaves (1992), Lim (1995) and Asano (1999). However, Felmingham and Zhang 
(2001) attained an implausibly high income elasticity of 1.2; a much lower income 
elasticity is expected due to increased financial efficiencies and scale economies in 
money demand.  
Sets of empirical results that question the stability of money demand in Australia 
include Felmingham and Zhang (2001), who found some instability in the 1990s, and 
                                                 
3  On a policy front, Papadopoulos and Zis (1997) are doubtful whether a monetary rule can provide an 
efficient anti-inflation policy framework. 
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Adams and Porter (1976) and Blundell-Wignall and Thorp (1987) who both provided 
evidence that led them to argue against the stability of narrow and broad monetary 
aggregates. Orden and Fisher (1993) examined the dynamic impacts of financial 
deregulation on M3 demand over the 1965-1989 period and found a cointegrating 
relationship between real M3 and prices and output series prior to the financial 
liberalization; however they did not support cointegration between M3 demand and its 
price and output determinants either over the full sample or after financial liberalization, 
and this implies instability in the M3 demand function over the entire period and 
especially subsequent to 1982. 
 
The case of New Zealand 
 
There is a dearth of empirical studies on money demand for New Zealand and the 
stability of her various monetary aggregates is yet to be determined. 
As noted above, Orden and Fisher (1993) found some instability of money 
demand in Australia; however their results for New Zealand are different as they found 
stability over the whole and sub-periods. Siklos (1995a, 1995b) examined the 
cointegrating links between M3, expected inflation and short term interest rates (the 
difference between NZ and US rates) over the 1981-1994 period and attained implausibly 
high income elasticities varying between 2 to 6. The income elasticities attained by Choi 
and Oxley (2004) and Valadkhani (2002) also seem unexpectedly high at around 1.7 and 
1.5, respectively. An income elasticity estimate that is more in line with expectations was 
provided by Razzak (2001) who found the income elasticity of monetary base to be 
around unity over the 1988-1997 period while asserting that the correlation between 
money and real output is stronger than that between money and inflation.  
 
Empirical issues 
 
Given that a number of major financial reforms were implemented by Australia and New 
Zealand since the 1960s to enhance the efficiency of their financial sectors it is entirely 
plausible that structural changes in their money demand may have occurred. Moreover, 
other events that influenced their domestic economies (such as natural disasters, oil price 
shocks and financial crises, etc.) may be associated with structural changes in the data 
series also. The failure to accommodate structural changes in the data series and 
cointegrating vectors could result in the attainment of misleading results. 
Although the aforementioned Australia and New Zealand studies offer important 
insight on monetary policy procedures their empirical results are neither mutually 
supportive nor equivocal. Furthermore, with the notable exception of Felmingham and 
Zhang (2001) for Australia (albeit with an implausibly high income elasticity), most 
studies used standard time series methods that allow for no formal tests of structural 
breaks. 
From the early 1980s, both countries underwent continuing economic 
liberalisation. In Australia, the mid-1980s saw financial deregulation and the Australian 
dollar float while in 2000 the introduction of a goods and services tax (GST) sought to 
encourage savings amongst low income earners. The formation of the Australian Stock 
Exchange Limited in 1987 and microeconomic reforms in the manufacturing sector both 
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boosted private investment. Similarly, a number of events also affected New Zealand’s 
economic performance; for instance, she lost her preferential trading position with the 
UK in 1973, embarked on financial market deregulations in the 1980s, undertook 
privatisation measures during 1980s and 1990s, and experienced the Asian financial 
crises and climate drought in the late 1990s. 
This paper fills this gap in the literature by presenting estimates of the demand for 
money (M1) for Australia and New Zealand over the 1960-2009 period. Structural breaks 
in the data series and cointegrating vectors are examined through the use of Lee and 
Strazicich (2003, 2004) and Gregory and Hansen (1996a, 1996b) methods; naturally 
Felmingham and Zhang (2001) were only able to apply the latter of these two methods. 
 
3. Specification and methods 
 
Conventionally the demand for money is specified as a function of real income and the 
nominal interest rate, however to capture the true cost of holding money we specify the 
demand for money in its canonical form and its extended versions, such that: 
 
0
0
ln ln( )                                                 (1)
ln ln( ) ln                       (2)
t y t R t t
t y t R t E t t t
m y R
m y R E π
θ θ θ ε
θ θ θ θ θ π ε
= + + +
= + + + + +
 
 
where 0θ = intercept, m = real narrow money stock, y = real output, R = cost of holding 
money proxied with the nominal short term interest rate, E = cost of holding money 
proxied with the real effective exchange rate, π = cost of holding money proxied with the 
inflation rate and ).,0( σε N≈  Real money balances are defined as the narrow monetary 
aggregate, M1, deflated by the GDP deflator. Real output is constructed using nominal 
GDP (deflated by the GDP deflator) and the change in the GDP deflator is our proxy of 
the inflation rate. The 3-month deposit rate is our proxy for the nominal interest rate. 
Annual data for the 1960-2009 period were obtained from International Financial 
Statistics (2010) and the World Development Indicators (2010). 
Our explicit expectation of the sign and magnitude of real income is positive and 
less than unity. Ball (2001) pointed out that low income elasticity estimates would imply 
that the Friedman rule is not optimal and that the money supply should grow more 
sluggishly than income to attain price stability. In advanced countries, the income 
elasticity is expected to be much lower than unity due to improvements in and 
developments of financial systems. Our explicit expectations of the signs and magnitudes 
of cost of holding money variables (nominal interest rate, inflation rate and real exchange 
rate) are negative and small.4 
 
Lee and Strazicich (2003) tests 
 
The endogenous two-break LM unit root tests proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003) can 
be explained using two models viz., model A and model C. Both models are based on 
                                                 
4  See Laidler (1993a, 1993b), Sriram (1999) and Hoffman and Rasche (2001) for surveys of long run 
elasticities of money demand. 
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alternative assumptions about structural breaks; model A allows for two shifts in the 
intercept and model C includes two shifts in the intercept and trend. 
Model A is specified as follows: 
 
'
1 2[1, , , ]                                                                                         (3)t t tZ t D D=  
 
where 1 for  > 1, 1, 2,and 0 otherwisejt BjD t T j= + = . The break date is denoted by BjT . The 
null and alternative hypotheses of model A are: 
 
0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
: + + + + ;                                                     (4)
: + + + + ;
t t t t t
t t t t
H y d B d B y
H y t d D d D
µ ν
µ γ ν
−=
=
 
 
The specification and null and alternative hypotheses of model C, respectively, are:  
 
'
1 2 1 2[1, , , , , ]                                                                  (5)t t t t tZ t D D DT DT=  
 
0 0 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 2
: + + + + + + ;                               (6)
: + + + + + + ;
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
H y d B d B d D d D y
H y t d D d D d DT d DT
µ ν
µ γ ν
−=
=
 
 
where  for  > 1, 1,2,and 0 otherwisejt Bj BjDT t T t T j= − + = ; 1 for  = 1, 1, 2,jt BjB t T j= + =  
and 0 otherwise; 1tν and 2tν denote the stationary error terms. The LM unit root test 
statistic can be obtained by estimating: 
 
'
1+ +                                                                             (7)tt t ty Z Sδ φ µ−∆ = ∆  
 
where = - -  , t=2,....,T;t xt tS y Zψ δ the regression of ty∆ provides estimates of 
δ ; 1x ty Zψ δ= − and the first observations of ty and tZ are 1y and  1Z , respectively. The 
LM test statistics are provided by τ which is the test statistic for the unit root null 
hypothesis that φ =0. 
Initially we allocated a maximum lag length of 8 periods and obtained the optimal 
lag length on the basis of the significance of the last lag. The break dates are determined 
where the LM test statistic is at its minimum. The critical values of this test are tabulated 
in Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004).  
 
Gregory and Hansen tests 
 
Unlike the Bai and Perron (2003) and Lee and Strazicich (2003) tests, Gregory and 
Hansen’s (1996a, 1996b) (henceforth GH) method is a test for structural changes in the 
cointegrating vector. The null hypothesis of no cointegration with structural breaks is 
tested against the alternative of cointegration. GH has postulated four models that are 
based on alternative assumptions about structural breaks: model 1 is a level shift; model 2 
is a level shift with trend; model 3 is a regime shift where both the intercept and the slope 
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coefficients change and model 4 is a regime shift where intercept, trend and slope 
coefficients all change. The single break date in these models is endogenously 
determined. Based on equation (2) the implied specification of these four models with 
structural breaks, respectively, are as follows: 
 
( )1 2 1 2 3 4ln ln( ) ln                                       8t tk t t t tm y R  Eµ µ ϕ α α α α π ε= + + + + + +   
 
( )1 2 1 1 2 3 4ln ln( ) ln                               9t tk t t t t tm t y R Eµ µ ϕ β α α α α π ε= + + + + + + +  
 
1 2 1 1 11 2 22
3 33 4 44
ln ln( ) ln( ) +  
ln + ln  +                                               (10)     
t tk t t tk t t tk
t t tk t t tk t
 m t y y R R
 E  E
µ µ ϕ β α α ϕ α α ϕ
α α ϕ α π α π ϕ ε
= + + + + +
+ + +
 
 
1 2 1 2 1 11 2 22
3 33 4 44
ln ln( ) ln( ) +  
ln + ln  +                                               (11)      
t tk tk t t tk t t tk
t t tk t t tk t
 m t t y y R R
 E  E
µ µ ϕ β β ϕ α α ϕ α α ϕ
α α ϕ α π α π ϕ ε
= + + + + + +
+ + +
 
 
A break date is selected where the absolute value of the ADF test statistic is at its 
maximum. The critical values for cointegration are tabulated in Gregory and Hansen 
(1996a, 1996b) and are used for testing cointegration in the EG method with unknown 
breaks.5 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Lee and Strazicich (2003) tests 
 
Endogenous two break minimum LM unit root tests were applied to assess the order of 
integration of variables. Table 1 reports the results for these tests based on models A and 
C which represent two breaks in the intercept (model A) and two breaks in the intercept 
and trend (model C). The test statistics of the LM unit root tests for the five variables (real 
M1, real income, nominal interest rate, real exchange rate and inflation rate) do not 
exceed the critical values in absolute terms and therefore the unit root null cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level. The t-statistics corresponding to the break dates are statistically 
significant at conventional levels (not reported for brevity). Break dates are fairly 
consistent across models, are expected for both countries and are in line with the timings 
of macroeconomic events outlined above. 
 
{Table 1 about here} 
 
Cointegration tests 
 
The GH method was applied to test for cointegration between the variables in canonical 
and extended equations of money demand (i.e. equations (1) and (2), respectively); 
results are provided in Table 2. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for 
canonical specification (1) in models 1 (break date [hereafter BD]: 1994) and 4 (BD: 
                                                 
5  Gregory and Hansen developed the critical values by modifying the MacKinnon (1991) procedure. 
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1984) for Australia and in models 3 (BD: 1998) and 4 (BD: 1984) for New Zealand. For 
specification (2), models 1 and 2 reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for 
Australia and the break dates are 1984 and 1997, respectively. Using the same 
specification, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected only in model 4 for New 
Zealand with a break date of 1984. These results support the existence of long run 
relationships of the demand for money in both countries. Explicitly, the results of the 
canonical form show that money demand is cointegrated with real income and the 
nominal interest rate; the same can be observed when the model is augmented with real 
exchange and inflation rates, as in the extended version. Break dates for both countries 
are consistent with those attained through the application of Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) 
method. A majority of the break dates are in 1980s; this is not unexpected because both 
countries underwent major economic reforms in the 1980s and the break dates may 
highlight the importance of financial reforms in these domestic economies. 
 
{Table 2 about here} 
 
Long run estimates 
 
GH cointegrating equations were estimated with the EG method and the results are 
presented in Table 3. Given a priori expectation that the income elasticity estimates 
should be less than unity, we can conclude that there are plausible results for Australia in 
model 4 (canonical specification) and model 1 (extended specification) and plausible 
results for New Zealand in model 4 (extended specification). The estimated coefficients 
in these models have expected signs and are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. For Australia, the income elasticity of money demand is around 0.64, 
which implies that a 1% increase in real income raises the demand for money by about 
0.64%, while for New Zealand the income elasticity of money demand is around 0.68, 
which implies that a 1% increase in real income would raise the demand for money by 
about 0.68%, all ceteris paribus.6 With these findings, we argue that the money demand 
relationships in Australia and New Zealand have undergone regime shifts where 
intercept, trend and slope coefficients have changed. Australian money demand has also 
undergone both intercept shift (extended specification) and regime shift (canonical 
specification) with the latter appearing to be dominant.  
 
{Table 3 about here} 
 
Sub-sample estimates 
 
Given the presence of these obtained break dates it is prudent to examine long run 
elasticities of money demand for sub-sample periods.7 The observed common break is 
1984, and moreover a break in late 1990s is also present for both countries. Consequently 
                                                 
6  We disregarded the estimates of other models for both countries because they are either statistically 
insignificant or have implausible income elasticity magnitudes. The canonical specification failed to 
explain the determinants of money demand for New Zealand, leading us to prefer the extended version. 
7  We only considered break dates of those models which reveal the existence of cointegration. 
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we select two sets of sub-samples such that pre-reforms periods are 1960-1983 and 1960-
1997 and post-reform periods are 1984-2009 and 1998-2009. 
Application of four time series methods viz., GETS, EG, FMOLS and 2SLS give 
consistent results for both sets of sub-samples;8 see Table 4 and 5 for the sub-sample 
cointegrating equations based on canonical and extended equations, respectively. The 
estimated coefficients have expected signs and are significant at conventional levels. 
Almost without exception, the income elasticity estimates are less than unity and the 
estimates of nominal interest, real exchange and inflation rates have the expected 
negative signs. 
 
{Table 4 about here} 
{Table 5 about here} 
 
The sub-sample estimates provide useful insight on whether the financial reforms 
had any significant effect. If they have been effective then there should be evidence for 
some economies of scale in the use of M1; further the response of the demand for money 
to the rate of interest should improve because of a progression towards more market-
based interest rate policies and increased capital mobility. In other words and relative to 
the pre-reform period, the post-reform sub-samples should show a relatively lower 
income elasticity estimate while the absolute value of the interest rate estimate should 
increase. 
The results in Table 4 and 5 show that income (interest rate) elasticities in both 
canonical and extended equations have declined (increased) in the post-reform sub-
samples. Further, in most cases the estimates of real exchange and inflation rates have 
increased relative to the pre-reform estimates. These observed changes in the long run 
elasticities seem to be slightly greater in the first set of sub-samples where the break date 
is 1984, and they may be illustrating that reforms have improved the financial efficiency 
in both countries. Also it is likely that structural breaks may have caused some short-run 
instability in the money demand functions. 
 
Short run estimates 
 
The short run error correction models (ECM) are estimated with Hendry’s GETS 
approach9 with the GH cointegrating equations used to establish the ECM models. The 
dependent variable (∆lnmt) is regressed on its lagged values, the current and lagged 
values of explanatory variables (∆ln(yt), ∆Rt, ∆lnEt and ∆πt) and the one period lagged 
residuals from the respective GH cointegrating equation. Application with a maximum of 
4 period lags and further application of variable deletion tests provide parsimonious ECM 
models, as reported in Table 6. Two ECM models are estimated using Australian data, 
based on GH models 1 and 4 and presented in columns Aus (1) and Aus (2); the results of 
the ECM model based on New Zealand data, which are based on GH model 4, are 
presented in column NZ (1). 
 
{Table 6 about here} 
                                                 
8  See Kumar et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Rao (2007) for details on alternative time series methods. 
9  See Taylor (1986) and Rao et al. (2010) for an overview and strengths of the GETS technique. 
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The short run dynamic estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level and 
the lagged error correction term (ECMt-1) has the expected negative sign; this implies a 
negative feedback mechanism which suggests that if there are departures from 
equilibrium in the previous period then this departure is reduced in the current period by 
about 21-25% for Australia and by about 11% for New Zealand.10 
 
Stability tests 
 
Finally, we assessed the stability of M1 demand functions using the Aus (2) and NZ (1) 
estimated equations for whole- and sub-sample periods through application of CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ; note that the results of the stability tests for equation Aus (1) gave 
qualitatively similar results. To conserve space, we report only the CUSUMSQ tests for 
sub-periods 1984-1998 and 1998-2009, as shown in Figures 1 to 4. 
 
{Insert Figures 1 to 4 about here} 
 
These stability tests illustrate that M1 demand functions were unstable in both 
countries over the 1984-1998 period, which may imply that the 1980s reforms did have a 
significant impact on the demand for money in both countries. However this impact on 
stability was temporary, as stability of M1 demand is not rejected after 1998. Further, M1 
stability is not rejected in the whole-sample period. 
The observed instability in money demand functions for both countries during the 
1984-1998 period implies that it would have been appropriate monetary policy stance for 
their central banks to target the rate of interest. However, there is lack of evidence to 
support instability in the money demand functions after 1998, and therefore it would not 
be unreasonable if these central banks chose to switch policies and target the money 
supply as their instrument of monetary policy.  
As emphasized by Poole (1970), the money supply (rate of interest) should be 
targeted if money demand is stable (unstable) and targeting the rate of interest when 
money demand is stable will accentuate instability in income. Under these circumstances, 
monetary targeting was the feasible policy stance for both countries.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the demand for real narrow money (M1) for Australia and New 
Zealand over the 1960-2009 period. Two specifications were considered: the canonical 
form and its extended form through augmentations of real exchange and inflation rates to 
capture the costs of holding money. Both specifications performed well for Australia but 
only the augmented version was plausible for New Zealand. The application of Lee and 
Strazicich’s (2003) endogenous two break minimum LM unit root tests reveal that the 
variables (real M1, real income, nominal interest rate, real exchange rate and inflation 
rate) are I(1) in levels. 
                                                 
10  The χ2 statistics indicate that there are no diagnostic test issues associated with serial correlation (χ2sc), 
functional form misspecification (χ2ff), non-normality (χ
2
n) or heteroskedasticity (χ
2
hs) in the residuals; 
hence, the short run dynamic results are well-determined and robust. 
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 Application of Gregory and Hansen’s method revealed that the cointegrating 
relationships of money demand underwent intercept and regime shifts in Australia and a 
regime shift in New Zealand. The results suggest a common break date of 1984; a break 
in the late 1990s was also present for both countries. Since the early 1980s both countries 
underwent continuing economic liberalisation and the early break date may be capturing 
the circumstances of financial reforms. Estimates for the entire period reveal income 
elasticity estimates of around 0.64 and 0.68 for Australia and New Zealand, respectively, 
and the demand for money responds negatively to variations in the nominal rate of 
interest, and real exchange and inflation rates, albeit by small amounts. 
 Application of four time series methods viz., GETS, EG, FMOLS and 2SLS gave 
consistent results for two sets of sub-samples with 1984 and 1998 break dates. The 
income (interest rate) elasticities in both canonical and extended equations declined 
(increased) in the post-reform sub-samples. This illustrates improvements in the financial 
system around the break dates that are closely associated with the financial reforms. 
 Stability tests showed that money demand functions were unstable in the period 
1984-1998 for both countries. The structural changes around 1984 did have a significant 
though temporary impact on the demand for money as the stability of M1 demand is not 
rejected after 1998. These findings imply that it would not have been unreasonable for 
their central banks to use the rate of interest as an instrument of monetary policy during 
the period of instability and, following Poole (1970), monetary targeting when the money 
demand is stable. 
 Future research could examine the nature of financial reforms and their individual 
impacts on the demand for money. Given that a number of reforms have been 
implemented since the 1980s along with a number of other important events, it would be 
useful to analyze their impacts more specifically. Further research could use structural 
break tests to examine the stability of broad money for both countries. 
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Table 1: Two-break minimum LM unit root test, 1960-2009 
 Australia New Zealand 
 Model A Model C Model A Model C 
Variables Test statistic 
Break 
dates 
Test 
statistic 
Break 
dates 
Test 
statistic 
Break 
dates 
Test 
statistic 
Break 
dates 
lnm -2.003 [4] 
1981; 
2005 
-1.047 
[2] 
1984; 
1986 
-0.263 
[3] 
1987; 
1998 
-3.987 
[3] 
1984; 
1986 
lny -3.112 [5] 
2000; 
2003 
-0.182 
[6] 
2003; 
2004 
-1.237 
[4] 
1973; 
1984 
-2.376 
[3] 
1995; 
2003 
R -1.280 [7] 
1984; 
1988 
-1.601 
[5] 
1981; 
1985 
-2.128 
[5] 
1975; 
1986 
-3.228 
[6] 
1997; 
2002 
lnE -2.152 [6] 
1987; 
1995 
-2.251 
[4] 
1987; 
1988 
-2.187 
[4] 
1986; 
1992 
-3.721 
[5] 
1988; 
1991 
π -2.120 [5] 
2000; 
2002 
-2.672 
[4] 
2001; 
2002 
-3.036 
[2] 
1984; 
1987 
-1.121 
[4] 
1995; 
2003 
Notes: The 5% critical values for Models A and C are -3.842 and -5.286, respectively.  The number in 
square brackets indicates the optimal number of lagged first-differenced terms included in the unit root test 
to correct for serial correlation. Critical values are taken from Lee and Strazicich (2004, 2003). 
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Table 2: Cointegration tests with structural breaks, 1960-2009 
 Specification / 
GH model 
Break date GH test statistic 5%  critical value Existence of 
cointegration 
      
      
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
Canonical Specification 
Model-1  
Model-2  
Model-3  
Model-4  
 
 
1994 
2000 
1987 
1984 
 
 
-5.036 
-1.754 
-0.306 
-4.667 
 
 
-3.190 
-3.190 
-3.190 
-3.190 
 
 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
 
Extended Specification 
Model-1 
Model-2 
Model-3  
Model-4 
 
1984 
1997 
1982 
2001 
 
-3.972 
-9.116 
-1.734 
-2.062 
 
-3.603 
-3.603 
-3.190 
-3.190 
 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
      
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
 
Canonical Specification 
Model-1  
Model-2  
Model-3  
Model-4  
 
 
1984 
1986 
1998 
1984 
 
-1.673 
-2.996 
-6.387 
-7.900 
 
-3.603 
-3.603 
-3.603 
-3.603 
 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Extended Specification 
Model-1  
Model-2  
Model-3  
Model-4  
 
 
1988 
1984 
2005 
1984 
 
 
-2.370 
-2.776 
-0.062 
-8.024 
 
-3.190 
-3.190 
-3.190 
-3.603 
 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
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Table 3: GH cointegrating equations, 1960-2009 
 Canonical specification Extended specification 
Model 1 
(Aus) 
Model 4 
(Aus) 
Model 3 
(NZ) 
Model 4 
(NZ) 
Model 1 
(Aus) 
Model 2 
(Aus) 
Model 4 
(NZ) 
C 
1.367 
(2.18)* 
0.662 
(2.26)* 
2.370 
(0.76) 
6.977 
(3.26)* 
0.890 
(3.26)* 
-3.467 
(0.77) 
1.028 
(6.87)* 
Dum  C 
 
-0.322 
(1.26) 
-1.263 
(2.55)* 
1.277 
(0.28) 
-0.283 
(1.24) 
-0.214 
(5.62)* 
-1.273 
(0.54) 
-0.552 
(1.96)* 
T 
 – 
0.002 
(7.85)* – 
0.161 
(2.34)* – 
0.334 
(2.31)* 
0.898 
(4.87)* 
Dum T 
 – 
-0.273 
(3.41)* – 
0.332 
(1.50) – – 
1.256 
(5.05)* 
ln yt 
2.560 
(0.25) 
0.643 
(4.76)* 
-1.231 
(1.18) 
3.277 
(1.61) 
0.635 
(4.29)* 
5.661 
(1.03) 
0.679 
(3.12)* 
Dum  ln yt – 
0.541 
(2.07)* 
-0.788 
(0.86) 
3.421 
(0.69) – – 
0.530 
(4.00)* 
Rt 
 
-0.162 
(1.24) 
-0.047 
(5.23)* 
-1.259 
(1.26) 
-0.887 
(1.52) 
-0.067 
(2.60)* 
-0.135 
(4.23)* 
-0.015 
(2.46)* 
Dum  Rt 
 – 
-0.011 
(1.99)* 
-0.323 
(0.13) 
-0.162 
(0.89) – – 
-0.008 
(2.01)* 
ln Et – – – – 
-0.099 
(5.64)* 
-0.350 
(0.76) 
-0.104 
(4.37)* 
Dum  ln Et 
 – – – – – – 
-0.087 
(1.75)** 
πt 
 – – – – 
-0.102 
(3.01)* 
-2.345 
(1.22) 
-0.045 
(3.03)* 
Dum  πt 
 – – – – – – 
-0.020 
(1.80)** 
Notes: Aus and NZ means Australia and New Zealand, respectively. Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance at 5% and 10% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively. C and T denote intercept and 
trend, respectively. Dummy variables are created using the break dates; for example, in canonical 
specification model 1 for Australia the break date is 1994 therefore dummy is unity after 1994. 
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Table 4: Cointegrating equations for sub-sample periods; Canonical specification 
 GETS EG 
 lny 
 (Aus) 
R 
(Aus) 
lny 
 (NZ) 
R 
(NZ) 
lny 
 (Aus) 
R 
(Aus) 
lny 
 (NZ) 
R 
(NZ) 
1960-
1983 
0.867 
(2.33)* 
-0.086 
(1.97)* 
0.890 
(7.54)* 
-0.023 
(2.45)* 
0.892 
(2.54)* 
-0.120 
(2.06)* 
0.853 
(3.24)* 
-0.009 
(2.60)* 
1984-
2009 
0.651 
(3.20)* 
-0.103 
(4.35)* 
0.717 
(3.47)* 
-0.765 
(1.87)** 
0.670 
(2.30)* 
-0.167 
(3.25)* 
0.652 
(3.07)* 
-0.102 
(2.01)* 
1960-
1997 
0.803 
(4.45)* 
-0.072 
(2.58)* 
0.856 
(4.35)* 
-0.176 
(2.36)* 
0.866 
(6.73)* 
-0.009 
(1.68)** 
0.843 
(3.85)* 
-0.086 
(2.33)* 
1998-
2009 
0.752 
(2.12)* 
-0.099 
(2.00)* 
0.785 
(5.32)* 
-0.189 
(2.89)* 
0.710 
(4.50)* 
-0.024 
(1.85)** 
0.802 
(4.01)* 
-0.105 
(1.70)** 
   
 FMOLS 2SLS 
lny 
 (Aus) 
R 
(Aus) 
lny 
 (NZ) 
R 
(NZ) 
lny 
 (Aus) 
R 
(Aus) 
lny 
 (NZ) 
R 
(NZ) 
1960-
1983 
0.923 
(2.87)* 
-0.092 
(1.69)** 
0.844 
(3.70)* 
-0.068 
(2.39)* 
0.958 
(1.90)** 
-0.177 
(2.69)* 
1.026 
(1.79)** 
-0.340 
(2.42)* 
1984-
2009 
0.697 
(2.34)* 
-0.103 
(3.95)* 
0.723 
(3.56)* 
-0.239 
(1.71)** 
0.693 
(2.56)* 
-0.181 
(1.80)** 
0.802 
(2.05)* 
-0.389 
(1.78)** 
1960-
1997 
0.899 
(3.04)* 
-0.016 
(1.76)** 
0.801 
(1.89)** 
-0.122 
(2.04)* 
0.870 
(2.37)* 
-0.024 
(2.16)* 
0.962 
(1.67)** 
-0.095 
(2.23)* 
1998-
2009 
0.778 
(3.20)* 
-0.018 
(1.68)** 
0.795 
(1.75)** 
-0.126 
(1.98)* 
0.791 
(4.04)* 
-0.029 
(1.82)** 
0.831 
(1.69)** 
-0.101 
(2.37)* 
Notes: Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses. Significance at 5% and 10% levels are indicated with * and **, 
respectively. Aus and NZ signifies Australia and New Zealand, respectively. 
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Table 5: Cointegrating equations for sub-sample periods; extended specification 
 GETS 
lny 
 (Aus) 
R 
(Aus) 
lnE 
 (Aus) 
π 
(Aus) 
lny 
 (NZ) 
R 
(NZ) 
lnE 
 (NZ) 
π 
(NZ) 
1960-1983 0.876 
(2.74)* 
-0.180 
(1.64)** 
-0.265 
(1.68)** 
-0.071 
(2.34)* 
0.885 
(4.35)* 
-0.005 
(2.67)* 
-0.820 
(5.46)* 
-0.553 
(1.67)** 
1984-2009 0.664 
(2.79)* 
-0.231 
(2.05)* 
-0.179 
(2.24)* 
-0.102 
(1.87)** 
0.703 
(3.74)* 
-0.103 
(1.99)* 
-1.067 
(3.28)* 
-0.871 
(1.70)** 
1960-1997 0.889 
(2.36)* 
-0.085 
(2.40)* 
-1.087 
(1.70)** 
-0.421 
(3.45)* 
0.900 
(1.76)** 
-0.096 
(2.74)* 
-0.127 
(1.80)** 
-0.162 
(2.51)* 
1998-2009 0.732 
(2.60)* 
-0.103 
(2.59)* 
-0.121 
(2.05)* 
-0.113 
(1.66)** 
0.843 
(2.04)* 
-0.105 
(2.29)* 
-0.134 
(1.89)** 
-0.239 
(1.87)** 
         
 EG 
lny 
 (Aus) 
R 
(Aus) 
lnE 
 (Aus) 
π 
(Aus) 
lny 
 (NZ) 
R 
(NZ) 
lnE 
 (NZ) 
π 
(NZ) 
1960-1983 0.873 
(2.32)* 
-0.076 
(3.25)* 
-0.016 
(1.80)** 
-0.082 
(2.60)* 
0.972 
(2.35)* 
-0.026 
(2.30)* 
-0.273 
(2.76)* 
-0.120 
(4.25)* 
1984-2009 0.612 
(2.05)* 
-0.189 
(2.43)* 
-0.210 
(2.07)* 
-0.112 
(1.64)** 
0.655 
(3.91)* 
-0.135 
(3.29)* 
-0.821 
(1.88)** 
-0.237 
(1.69)** 
1960-1997 0.874 
(2.88)* 
-0.021 
(2.37)* 
-0.127 
(2.16)* 
-0.062 
(1.70)** 
0.921 
(4.36)* 
-0.011 
(2.82)* 
-0.062 
(2.36)* 
-0.028 
(2.73)* 
1998-2009 0.718 
(1.98)* 
-0.175 
(2.31)* 
-0.188 
(1.66)** 
-0.100 
(1.90)** 
0.835 
(2.52)* 
-0.082 
(1.75)** 
-0.283 
(3.03)* 
-0.184 
(1.79)** 
         
 FMOLS 
lny 
 (Aus) 
R 
(Aus) 
lnE 
 (Aus) 
π 
(Aus) 
lny 
 (NZ) 
R 
(NZ) 
lnE 
 (NZ) 
π 
(NZ) 
1960-1983 1.073 
(2.67)* 
-0.008 
(3.87)* 
-0.190 
(2.60)* 
-0.002 
(1.67)** 
0.890 
(1.85)** 
-0.133 
(2.08)* 
-0.006 
(2.06)* 
-0.122 
(4.25)* 
1984-2009 0.734 
(2.29)* 
-0.056 
(1.65)** 
-0.197 
(2.92)* 
-0.025 
(1.84)** 
0.751 
(2.11)* 
-0.205 
(1.79)** 
-0.133 
(1.69)** 
-0.207 
(2.21)* 
1960-1997 0.974 
(2.27)* 
-0.040 
(3.23)* 
-0.134 
(2.74)* 
-0.012 
(2.37)* 
0.673 
(3.37)* 
-0.016 
(2.14)* 
-0.026 
(2.93)* 
-0.016 
(2.91)* 
1998-2009 0.705 
(3.28)* 
-0.104 
(3.29)* 
-0.189 
(1.82)** 
-0.333 
(3.02)* 
0.669 
(2.42)* 
-0.116 
(2.00)* 
-0.088 
(1.93)** 
-0.195 
(2.21)* 
         
 2SLS 
lny 
 (Aus) 
R 
(Aus) 
lnE 
 (Aus) 
π 
(Aus) 
lny 
 (NZ) 
R 
(NZ) 
lnE 
 (NZ) 
π 
(NZ) 
1960-1983 0.781 
(2.56)* 
-0.016 
(3.55)* 
-0.082 
(2.29)* 
-0.017 
(2.97)* 
0.967 
(2.86)* 
-0.022 
(2.83)* 
-0.156 
(2.83)* 
-0.107 
(2.45)* 
1984-2009 0.599 
(2.25)* 
-0.020 
(1.79)** 
-0.230 
(3.12)* 
-0.104 
(3.28)* 
0.760 
(2.42)* 
-0.156 
(4.39)* 
-0.354 
(1.77)** 
-0.178 
(2.04)* 
1960-1997 0.874 
(2.00)* 
-0.001 
(1.68)** 
-0.014 
(2.21)* 
-0.008 
(2.37)* 
0.733 
(1.77)** 
-0.002 
(3.44)* 
-0.008 
(1.70)** 
-0.026 
(2.83)* 
1998-2009 0.712 
(2.37)* 
-0.088 
(2.34)* 
-0.022 
(1.83)** 
-0.036 
(1.80)** 
0.623 
(2.69)* 
-0.029 
(1.67)** 
-0.120 
(1.86)** 
-0.195 
(2.55)* 
Notes: Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance at 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, is indicated with * and **. Aus and NZ means Australia and New Zealand. 
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Table 6: Short run estimates, 1960-2009 
 Aus (1) Aus (2) NZ (1) 
Intercept 1.236 (6.05)* 12.627 (7.81)* 4.013 (7.95)* 
ECMt-1 -0.246 (6.06)* -0.211 (7.39)* -0.113 (6.20)* 
∆lnmt-2 – -1.267 (2.36)* – 
∆lnyt-1 0.726 (3.45)* – 0.026 (2.44)* 
∆lnyt-2 – 1.266 (6.48)* – 
∆lnEt-2 – -1.006 (3.41)* -3.200 (2.35)* 
∆Rt-2 -0.253 (4.59)* -0.677 (2.26)* – 
    
Adjusted R2 0.803 0.816 0.763 
SEE 0.065 0.063 0.077 
X2sc 0.324 (0.57) 0.676 (0.41) 0.893 (0.35) 
X2ff 3.325 (0.17) 3.063 (0.38) 0.259 (0.61) 
X2n 0.371 (0.83) 0.500 (0.78) 1.085 (0.58) 
X2hs 0.020 (0.89) 0.025 (0.90) 0.006 (0.94) 
Notes: Dependent variable in each regression is ∆lnmt. Absolute t-ratios for the variables and the p-values 
for the chi-square (X2) tests are in parentheses. Significance at the 5% level is indicated with *.  Aus and 
NZ signifies Australia and New Zealand. 
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Figure 1: Australian M1 stability, 1984-1998 
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Figure 2: Australian M1 stability, 1998-2009 
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Figure 3: New Zealand M1 stability, 1984-1998 
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Figure 4: New Zealand M1 stability, 1998-2009 
 
 
 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
  
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009
